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SECURITIES REGULATION: DOCTRINES OF
IN PARI DELICTO AND UNCLEAN HANDS
HELD TO BAR 10b-5 RECOVERY BY
TIPPEE AGAINST CORPORATE INSIDER
In Kuelinert v. Texstar Corp.,, the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit applied the equitable doctrines of unclean hands and
in pai delicto to deny recovery under section 10(b) of the Securities
and Exchange Act- and rule l0b-53 to a "tippee" injured as a
result of reliance on false, non-public information received from a
corporate insider. In January, 1965, Texstar Corporation began
negotiations for a merger agreement with Coronet Petroleum
Company under which Texstar, pursuant to a planned Type "C"
reorganization, would acquire the corporate assets of Coronet in
exchange for Texstar stock. Rhame, then president of Texstar,
informed a personal friend, Kuehnert, of the proposed, though
unpublicized, acquisition, and of supposedly "secret" discoveries of
oil on Coronet land which would result in dividends of $3 per share
plus a substantial increase in the value of Texstar stock. Kuehnert,
relying on this confidential inside information, purchased large
amounts of Texstar stock on margin in the open market.' When
Rhame's representations as to the oil discoveries and projected
earnings proved to be false, Kuehnert was forced to sell his
holdings at a loss. He sued Rhame and Texstar, alleging violations
of section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act' and rule lOb-
5.7 Rhame contended that plaintiff was barred from recovery by
' F.2d - (5th Cir. 1969) (CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1 92,406 (May 9, 1969)).
- 15 .U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964).
- 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1968).
'See B. BITTKER & J. 'USTICE. FEDERAL INCOM1E TAXATIONC OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS § 12.14 (2d ed. 1966).
Kuehnert purchased about 40,000 shares of Texstar prior to disclosure of the merger
between Coronet and Texstar. In April of 1965 Texstar shareholders approved the merger.
No mention at that time was made of the favorable oil discoveries or anticipated earnings.
Nevertheless, upon reassurances of Rhame as to the validity of the information. Kuchnert
continued to buy. Kuehnert sought recovery on these post-merger purchases.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964).
* 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 reads: 'It shall be unlawful for any person. directly or
indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails
or of any facility of any national securities exchange. (a) To employ any device, scheme, or
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virtue of his own conduct in knowingly buying on the basis of
undisclosed inside information., The district court granted the
defendants' motions for summary judgment on the merits, holding
that, even assuming Rhame gave Kuehnert information which
Rhame knew to be fraudulent, Kuehnert was barred from recovery
by his own misconduct as a tippee? In a divided opinion the circuit
court affirmed.'
With passage of the Securities and Exchange Act in 1934,
Congress continued the effort initiated in 1933 to protect the
investor from fraud and deception on the Nation's securities
markets." Directing its attention to the general trading of
securities, Congress vested the Securities and Exchange
Commission with broad rule-making powers to prevent the use of
manipulative and deceptive devices in the purchase and sale of
securities.' 2 Pursuant to this mandate, rule l0b-5, the general
antifraud provision, was promulgated.'i: Intended as an extension of
federal regulation of fraudulent practices by purchasers of
securities," the ambit of rule l0b-5 has become a body of federal
corporation law within itself,'! and the development of the rule in
the area of insider trading has been pervasive. The preliminary step
artifice to defraud. (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made. in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made. not misleading, or (c) To engage in an act.
practice. or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person, in connection with the purchase or sale or any security."
"See Ross v. Licht, 263 1-. Supp. 395, 409-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
1286 F. Supp. 340 (S.D. Tex. 1968).IDo F.2d - (5th Cir. 1969).
"See 2 L. Loss. SECURITIES REGULATION 784-85 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as
Loss].
'I Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act provides: "It shall be unlawful for
any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange--. . . (b) To
use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a
national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors."
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964); see W. PAINTER, FEDERAL REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING 19
(1968).
"
2 See generally Note. Fiduciary Suits Under Rule lOb-5. 1968 DUKE L.J. 791.
" See Cohen, "'Truth in Securities" Revisited. 79 HARv. L. REv. 1340, 1364-65 (1966).
"5See. e.g.. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968). See also Note,
Breach oJ Fiduciary Duty Involving Full Director Knowledge Held lOb-5 Violation. 1969
DUKE L.J. 383.
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came in 1947 with the development of an implied civil remedy for
the aggrieved investor.Y However, the real evolution of the rule's
application to insider trading began in 1961, when the Commission
expressed its view that the disclosure obligations of rule lOb-5
extended to persons outside the "traditional" insider groups of
directors, officers and shareholders. 7 In disciplining a broker who
had acted for certain discretionary accounts on the basis of
confidential inside information, the Commission constructed a
disclosure obligation which rested on the existence of a special
relationship giving access to inside information intended only for
corporate purposes and on the inherent unfairness of a party to a
securities transaction acting with confidential information not
available to other parties to the transaction. 8 At least one court
has held that tippees (persons given information by insiders in
breach of trust) possess the same "special relationship" and
consequently are subject to the same duty as insiders. 9 However,
this extension of "insider" to include the tippee had apparently
never been approved by a circuit court. The Second Circuit has
adopted a view of the lOb-5 "insider" seemingly broad enough to
include the tippee,2 0 but has refused to consider tippee liability per
se'2 Thus the issue of tippee culpability, though raised, was not
settled.22
If the liability of a tippee to innocent third parties remained
unsettled, the issue of liability between two wrongdoers, such as a
tippee and an insider, remained untouched. As a general rule at
common law, if parties were in parn delicto, a court would aid
neither and leave the loss where it fell.? Similarly, if an injured
party seeking redress was guilty of misconduct on his own part, the
doctrine of unclean hands would often be used to preclude relief.2
16 Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947). See generally Note,
lnplying Civil Remedies Fron Federal Regulatory Statutes. 77 HARv. L. REv. 285 (1963).
17 In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
"Id. at 912.
"Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 409-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 847-48 (2d Cir. 1968): see W. PAINTER.
supra note 12, at 223-24.
-' 401 F.2d at 852-53.
n For opinions of two writers on the liability of the tippee under rule I0b-5, see W.
PAINTER, supra note 12, at 142-43; 3 Loss 1450-5 1.
213 J. PO.1EROY. EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 940 (5th ed. 1941) [hereinafter cited as
POIEROY].
- ' 2 POIEROY § 397. See generally Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive
[Vol. 1969: 832
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However, the doctrines were not without limitations, and courts
refused to apply them where to do so would work a greater injustice
on the public interest than nonapplication. "-? Similarly, where the
defendant's misconduct far exceeded that of the plaintiff, courts
frequently chose not to invoke the doctrines:2 The doctrines of
unclean hands and in pari delicto have also been accepted as
defenses under federal law,27 and can be raised by parties or courts
themselves" on the theory that they exist as protective devices for
the integrity of the courts29 An exception or limitation to their use,
similar to the limitations applied at common law, has been the
refusal to apply them where the plaintiff's action served a
significant role in the enforcement of a federally-defined
proscription created for the public benefit:10 Thus, in an antitrust
treble damage suit, denial of the defenses of in pari delicto and
unclean hands has frequently been justified on grounds of the
importance of the private treble damage action in advancement of
the aims of antitrust legislation and of the greater public benefit to
be achieved by allowing recovery without regard to the relative
moral culpability of the parties.*" Such limitations are not absolute,
however, and where the plaintiff has actively participated or
initiated the scheme, or where his conduct might be termed that of
a co-conspirator, the doctrines may still be available. 2
In pari delicto and unclean hands have been applied infrequently
in the area of securities regulation3 In Gaudiosi v. Mellon,3 the
defense of unclean hands was successfully asserted to deny
declaratory relief in a proxy solicitation where the plaintiff had
deliberately and maliciously violated S.E.C. proxy rules by
Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945): Z. CHAFEE. SOME PROBLEMS OF i:QUITY 1
(1950). Traditionally rules of equity, time and the "single cause of action" have lead to the
acceptance of in pari delicto and unclean hands in actions at law. See Union Pacific R.R. v.
Chicago & North Western Ry., 226 F. Supp. 400, 410 (N.D. Ill. 1964); 4 POXIEROY § 1368.
!See 3 POMEROY § 941.
See Id. at § 942.
See. e.g., Precision Instruments Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co.. 324
U.S. 806 (1945).
-4See Ford v. Caspers, 42 F. Supp. 994, 997-98 (N.D. I11. 1941).
=See Gaudiosi v. Mellon. 269 F.2d 873, 882 (3d Cir.). cert. denied. 361 U.S. 902 (1959).
Q See Perma-Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134. 139 (1968).
I' ld.
- Id. at 140.
See 2 Loss 955-56.
' 269 F.2d 873 (3d Cir.), cert. denied. 361 U.S. 902 (1959).
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intimidating shareholders.?5 However, this action occurred prior to
the Supreme Court's statement in J.I. Case Co. v. Borak31 that
private actions concerning proxy rule violations, much like antitrust
treble damage litigation, serves a necessary enforcement function
Nevertheless, since Borak at least one court has refused to
recognize the importance of the public remedy3 and allowed the
assertion of the unclean hands defense in proxy solicitation
litigation0 9
In allowing the defendant in Texstar to present the plaintiff's
misconduct as a defense, the circuit court in Texstar first decided
that illegal conduct by the plaintiff could bar recovery in a private
action under rule l0b-571 The court viewed the antitrust exception
to the doctrine of in pari delicto" as being based on public policy
grounds 2 However, the degree of public interest in allowing private
securities law actions, where the question is merely one of
accounting between joint conspirators, was deemed not comparable
to the public interest involved in antitrust treble damage litigation
with its far-reaching economic results 3 Furthermore, even in the
antitrust context, in pari delicto might still apply where plaintiff
and defendant were true co-conspirators?- Since the same factors
involved in the exception to in pari delicto in antitrust actions were
not present in the instant securities action, the court decided in par!
delicto was a viable doctrine in rule lOb-5 private litigation. The
court reasoned that if Kuehnert actually had withheld material,
inside information from his vendors, this active misconduct would
have made him in pari delicto."5 However, since the information
given Kuehnert was false and thus not material, the court had more
difficulty with the question of whether Kuehnert's belief that he had
material information was sufficient to create a disclosure
obligation. Of particular importance to the court was the fact that
'Id. at 881-82.
: 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
Id. at 432.
a' See notes 30-31 supra and accompanying text.
' Studebaker Corp. v. Allied Prod. Corp.. 256 F. Supp. 173 (W.D. Mich. 1966).
-. F.2d -. - (5th Cir. 1969).
"See notes 31 & 32 supra and accompanying text.
12 F.2d at
' Id.




attempted fraud, potential fraud or unsuccessful fraud could bring
Commission action.4 Also, the court viewed both successful fraud
and attempted fraud as within the section 10(b) language of "any
manipulative or deceptive device. ' -7 Since, in applying the equitable
doctrine of unclean hands, courts were concerned only with the state
of the plaintiff's mind,48 Kuehnert's fraudulent intent and status as
a tippee was sufficient to bar recovery for unclean hands.4 ' Noting
that the application of the doctrines was purely discretionary and
that the question was one of policy, 0 the majority of the Texstar
court decided that denial of recovery in this instance, though it
might encourage similar insider fraud, would be better than
permitting tippee recovery, in effect giving him an "enforceable
warranty that secret information [was] true."'" Since the growth of
rule lOb-5 liability had not been stunted by the lack of tippee suits
against the insider, and since substantial deterrent factors were
already operating against the corporate insider, the court reasoned
that the better choice was to leave the loss where it fell.-3 '
Of initial significance, though not surprising, was the Texstar
court's holding, implicit in its discussion and use of in pai delicto
and unclean hands, that rule lOb-5 disclosure obligations applied to
the tippee trading with undisclosed information' : The dissent in
Texstar. though conceding tippee liability, would have had the
court hold that the doctrines of in pari delicto and unclean hands
are inapplicable to private actions under rule lOb-5. Indeed, the
broad language of the Supreme Court in Peinia-Lije Mujflers, Inc.
v. International Parts Corp. ,3 that these common law doctrines
were inappropriate where "a private suit serves important public
purposes, "' when read against the great development of rule lOb-5
that has resulted from private actions would apparently support
this view. However, the argument for general inapplicability of the
doctrine is questionable on several grounds. First, to deny courts
tO Id. at-.
SSecurities and Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964).
"See generally 3 Loss 1451; W. PAINTCR. supra note 12, at 143-44, 223-24.
11 F.2d at
I d. at_.
• I d. at - .
Id. at-.; see note 23 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 19-21 supra and accompanying text.
31392 U.S. 134 (1968).
0Id. at 138.
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access to the doctrines of in pari delicto and unclean hands might
deprive them of a valuable tool in protection of their integrity by
allowing wrongdoers access to the courts to recover the fruits of
their fraudulent act*- Where the plaintiff has engaged in active
misconduct, which is not only illegal but frustrates the disclosure of
all material information as much as the conduct of the defendants,
there seems no good reason why courts should not have discretion
to deny him recovery'- Allowance of such discretion would give the
court the opportunity to measure, in the light of public interest,
"the substance of the right asserted by plaintiff against the
transgression which, it is contended, serves to foreclose that
right."5 8 Secondly, the proponents for general inapplicability of the
doctrines have not fully established that Perma-Lijf completely
obviated the use of in pari delicto and unclean hands in the
antitrust context. There are implications that the doctrines may still
be alive where plaintiff and defendant are true co-conspirators,31
suggesting that the Pernma-Life holding goes to the discretion of the
doctrines' use rather than to their total unavailability. Finally, the
analogy of lOb-5 actions to the antitrust treble damage suit may be
invalid, given the fact that private rule 1Ob-5 actions have
developed without the necessity for actions by those who might be
in pari delicto.11" In sharp contrast is the fear expressed in Pernia-
Life that application of the doctrines might "threaten the
effectiveness" or "seriously [undermine] the usefulness" of the
private action as an enforcement tool of antitrust policy."
Thus, the real point to scrutinize in Texstar is not the court's
determination that the equitable doctrines of in par! delicto and
unclean hands were available in a securities law action, but rather
the decision of the majority to allow the defenses to be asserted in
the instant case so as to erase the possibility of the "defrauded-
tippee" suit. With the initial decision that the defenses were not
barred generally as a matter of law, the question of application in
r Cy. Union Pacific R. R. v. Chicago and North Western Ry., 226 F. Supp. 400. 410
(N.D. III. 1964).
See 2 Loss 955-56.
Republic Molding Corp. v. B.W. Photo Utilities, 319 F.2d 347. 350 (9th Cir. 1963).
' Perma-Lire MuMers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp.. 392 U.S. 134, 140 (1968). But
see id. at 148 (Marshall, J.. concurring in the result).
See - F.2d at -.
" Perma-Lire Mufflers. Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134. 136, 139 (1968).
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Texstar became one of policy-a determination of whether allowing
the defenses to deny recovery by the tippee would, in this case, better
advance the securities law objective of investor protection.2 Pre-
liminary to this determination was an identification by the court of
the threat to investor protection presented in Texstar. As in many
rule lOb-5 insider actions, the threat to the investor appeared to
arise from the flow of confidential information from insider to
tippee. Thus, the dissent in Texstar seemingly justifiably saw the
majority's decision to place the burden of loss on the tippee rather
than on the insider, the origin of dissemination, as "precisely the
wrong way effectually to restrain tips from circulating. ' '13 Focusing
on the tippee, the dissent reasoned, would simply have no deter-
rent effect on the source of the flow-the corporate insider.'
The fallacy of this criticism, however, lies in the assumption that a
contrary decision in Texstar would have had a practical deterrent
effect on the flow of confidential data. Whereas the possibility of
the tippee action might deter the insider-tipster from giving know-
ingly frilse information to the tippee, it would have absolutely no
preventive effect on the insider disseminating true information, po-
tentially far more harmful to the outsider-shareholder. 5  The
more reasonable view is then that a contrary decision in Texstar
would have had little, if any, net effect on theflow of inside informa-
tion. On the other hand, as the majority likely realized, the setting
in Texstar did present a very good opportunity for an attack on
the use of inside information, that is, trading on the market with
the benefit of confidential data. While present law theoretically
prevented this use by the tippee, problems of detection and tracing
made the sanction a questionable deterrent. Moreover, not only
was present law less than effective against the use of confidential
information, but, as the Texstar majority apparently saw, the "de-
frauded-tippee" suit represented a potential aggravation of the
situation. If the tippee knew he could recoup trading losses should
inside information prove false, he would thus likely never question
- F.2d at
Id. at - (Godbold. J.. dissenting).
GIld. at - (Godbold. J.. dissenting).
'" Likewise. the "derrauded tippee' suit would not meet the case or dissemination or
negligently false information since, in this situation of non-privity of the parties. the non-
trading, misrepresenting party would likely be liable only for intentional misstatements. See
Ruder, Civil Liabiliy Under Rule lob-5. 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 423, 444-45 (1968).
Vol. 1969: 8321
DUKE LA W JOURNAL
the veracity of his tip and would be encouraged to use the tip to the
detriment of other investors by trading on the open market where
the chance of detection was slim. However, if the defrauded tippee
were denied the availability of recovery, thus putting the risk of loss
from the use of false information on him in every case, whether the
tip was true or false, the tippee would be faced with the question or
uncertainty of whether he should rely on inside information the
veracity of which he is necessarily unsure. A reasonable conclusion is
that faced with this dilemma, the tippee's use of inside information-
his trading activity-will likely be at a lower level than it would be
were he assured of the truth of his tip.6 Thus, since the use of inside
information by the tippee can be as much of a threat to the securities
law policy of investor protection as theflow of confidential data from
the corporate insider, the majority decision in Texstar to apply the
doctrines of in par delicto and unclean hands to bar recovery by a
defrauded tippee seems the more effective method to protect that
policy.
"- F.2d at
[V'ol. 1969: 832
